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Abstract: The goal of this study is to deal with three reasons explaining the 
importance and necessity of moral education – not just in schools but in general. The 
research question is: Why do we need moral education? Each subchapter of this study 
will provide answers or grounds from which the necessity of moral education will be 
deduced, and which I intend to expose in this study. They apply to three particular 
areas: 1) the nature of the human being as a moral being, 2) the nature of moral reality 
itself, and 3) the speciϐic nature of the postmodern situation in which we recognize 
the need for moral formation. The analysis of the three phenomena provides an 
argument for traditional moral realism which not only grounds any moral education 
but also makes it possible. Moral education proves to be not merely necessary but 
also philosophically legitimate. 
Keywords: morality, education, human nature, modernity, post-modernity
1 “Why?” questions in moral education
There is not much room in the educational sciences for the “Why?” questions 
today. This seems to be a side effect of modern pragmatism which redirected 
the focus of people’s questioning to a methodological “How?” instead. It is an 
understandable phenomenon in the context of the Enlightenment paradigm 
of human autonomy in which we busy ourselves: how to make ourselves 
better, more open-minded, civilized, advanced, etc. The development of new 
techniques and technologies that make communication, travel, production, 
medicine – as well as killing – easier has been so hasty that there’s been not 
much time to ask “Why?” Nor has there been a reason to ask whether all the 
new scientiϐic advances are necessary, whether people want them or need 
them, or whether the cost is worth it. Why question the meaning, purpose or 
goals when we have the undisputable “progress” generating and sanctifying 
means which keep us busy enough and protect us from the annoying and 
difϐicult meta-questions? (cf. Wilson, 1991; Toulmin, 1990)
1 A Czech translation of this paper was published in e-Pedagogium journal (3/2014). 
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Modern pedagogy has not been an exception. For the last one hundred years 
it has been frantically trying to keep up with the times but continues to fall 
short. Reform after reform, theorists and practitioners of education have 
been working hard for more and more effective methods, empirical sciences 
supply pedagogues with technical achievements of every sort, research 
overϐlows with “how-to” applications (and they are good applications) – but 
in spite of all these we continue to fall short of the hoped-for universally 
harmonious and well-developed humanity. Pavel Floss, for example, states 
that contemporary schools “are reduced merely to the functional aspect of 
education, producing efϐicient employees or experts but failing to cultivate 
the whole humanity of an individual” (2005, p. 26). And the “why” questions 
still are not in the course. Teachers can’t allow themselves such a luxury. 
They must invest most of their time and energy in maintaining their 
qualiϐications: that is, they have to keep their communicative, methodological, 
organizational, diagnostic and other competencies in shape. And with the 
arrival of post-modernity, the situation is not much better – in fact, it is quite 
the opposite. Educators now regularly have to put all of their pedagogical 
arsenal to the test of hermeneutical doubt, and at the same time adapt to 
the almost unadaptable conditions of the times. On top of all that they have 
to make sure their products are appropriately marketable, for the God of 
Quantiϐiable Growth demands his due (compare Palouš, 2008; Rýdl, 2002). 
I am convinced that the crisis of the modern paradigm, which today’s world 
so intensively experiences, can be used for the good. We thought we knew 
“how to” but it has become apparent that we do not. We hoped that moral 
reϐinement would blossom, ϐlourish or prosper with rational knowledge 
and science but it hasn’t. We believed that the more a person knew the more 
human they would be but it is clear that it is more complicated than that. The 
dissolution of our illusions is never pleasant but, however, if its side effect 
is to bring a certain amount of humility and willingness to once again ask 
the basic questions about what exactly we are doing and why, then it is not 
in vain. The pedagogical “why” always precedes and deϐines the subsequent 
“how.” It would therefore be a mistake to leave it out or ignore it altogether. 
We intuitively resist senselessness, and it is a human characteristic to want 
to know the reason – to know why we do what we do. Moral education is no 
exception to this. Therefore, in this study the reasons for the necessity of 
morally-educated conduct are dealt with. 
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The grounds from which the necessity of moral education is deduced and 
which I intend to expose in the following paragraphs apply to three speciϐic 
areas: (1) the nature of a human being as a moral being, (2) the nature of moral 
reality itself, and (3) the speciϐic nature of the postmodern situation in which 
we recognize the need for moral formation. To prevent misunderstanding 
concerning the goal(s) of this study, let me deϐine its boundaries in the very 
beginning. I do neither aspire to present a complete theory of moral education 
nor any speciϐic instructional strategy of character formation.2 Such themes 
go far beyond the possibilities and scope of this essay. All I plan to do is to 
make preliminary philosophical observations, to clarify the foundations or 
reasons for our speciϐically human acting which we call moral education. 
2  Neither angels nor demons: The ambivalence of 
human nature
Humans are rather ambivalent beings. As opposed to every other thing 
in one’s environment, a person’s nature or essence is not given ahead of 
time like, for example, an earthworm is given its earthwormness, wood its 
woodenness, or a square its squareness. A square can’t do anything to change 
its squareness. It can’t degenerate into something less square, nor can it 
become more square. But a person can. A human being is capable of both 
humanity and inhumanity (Sokol, 2002). A person can consciously choose 
and act, and does so every single day. How can that be?
We are capable of overwhelmingly beautiful and noble things, we’re able to 
create, to write poetry or to sing in a way that gives life to another. We can 
not only desire, think, explore and invent but also keep the power and depth 
of our thoughts and discoveries completely under control. Furthermore, we 
can laugh, rejoice, love, reach out to one another, be courageous, selϐless, 
even risk our own life. Moreover, we are able to forgive, be reconciled with 
one another, help others, deny ourselves, return a lost wallet full of money… 
unbelievable! Our philosopher forefathers said that it is because humans 
are spiritual beings. The three basic spiritual qualities that separate us from 
mere matter are reason, will and emotions. That is the ability to appreciate 
and be touched by truth, goodness and beauty (Odehnal, 2001).
2 There is a number of other authors who developed such theories and strategies. See for 
example Holmes (1984), Hoge (2002), Vacek (2008), Olivar (1992), Glanzer (2014). For 
Comenius’ unique notion of moral education see my studies Character formation: A forgotten 
theme of Comenius’s didactics (2011a) or Vzdělání mravné a nemravné: vztah poznání a ctnosti 
v Komenského pedagogice (2011b).
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Extraordinary nobility sharply contrasts with remarkable depravity. People 
can be evil, and not only as a by-product of failing at something or missing 
a goal; but truly and completely intentionally they prove to have evil 
designs, to want evil, to be evil-minded. And not only that, they are capable 
of meanness, lust, spite, cowardice, inϐidelity, ruthlessness; they are proud, 
rude, selϐish, they know how to lie very cleverly, how to steal, cheat, wound, 
rape, invent machines of torture and even take the life of their neighbour. 
And most astonishingly of all, coming to such evil they demonstrate their 
willingness to use their depravity to the fullest. As G. K. Chesterton said 
(1992, p. 12), mankind is the only being that can experience a very special 
and exquisite pleasure in skinning a cat alive.3
The inconsistency of human nature is so mystifying and unsettling that 
we often resort to various shortcuts or evasive manoeuvres. For example, 
it would be a lot more bearable if human good and evil could somehow be 
neatly localized in space or time: good and evil, us/them, east/west, modern/
ancient, light/darkness, believer/pagan, angels on the left, demons on the 
right. Then it would be clear, predictable, black and white.4 But of course with 
humankind it matters are more complex. The good and evil dwell together. 
A person is a “living oxymoron,” as Peter Kreeft (1990) put it nicely, “noble 
depravity, depraved nobility (p. 28).” We are a puzzle to ourselves, added 
Thomas Morris (1992, p. 129), the greatest mystery is residing in us. How 
can one and the same creature produce, at the same time, indescribable 
beauty and unbelievable abomination? How can it be that one species can 
be responsible for such excellent good and appalling horror? How can 
there be unprecedented benevolence married to unheard-of cruelty in one 
being? Blaise Pascal (1995, frag. 131, 34) showed similar amazement in his 
immortal anthropological meditation: “How strange man is! How original, 
how monstrous, how chaotic, how paradoxical, how vast! The judge of all 
things, a lowly worm, a fountain of truth and a murky cesspool of error, glory 
and the shame of the universe!”
3 A loose paraphrase.
4 Yet another popular strategy for comparing the ambivalence of human nature is the method 
we could call “the blind eye” (Kreeft, 1990). There is not anything easier than to turn a blind 
eye to one or another side of human nature, to trivialize it, to pretend it is nothing, and so on. 
Those who elevate the spiritual aspects of mankind at the expense of those lower physically-
grounded ones are usually identiϐied as adherents of Platonism, Gnosticism, Pantheism and 
other forms of humanism. Alternatively, followers of the opposite camp either question the 
validity of or ignore altogether the spiritual side of life and instead only consider what is 
tangible. These are the Marxists, Freudians, Behaviourists and Darwinians.
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“Corruptio optimi pessima”5 says the wise old proverb, because there really 
is not anything worse than the combination of brilliance or genius and 
evil. The greater the potential, the greater the splendour if it is activated 
positively – but the greater the horror if otherwise. And the potential of 
mankind is immeasurable. If it were possible to morally corrupt ants or 
earthworms there would undoubtedly be a problem, and they could commit 
all kinds of harm, because even they are endowed with a certain potential. 
However. it is not possible to take the comparison with humans very far, for 
a person’s intellect, creativity, imagination, resourcefulness, will and many 
other capacities make him or her at once the greatest and the most abysmal 
creature under the sun. If practical consequences of the ambivalence of 
human nature were not so tragic, it would be laughable how they prove 
the (often nasty) jokes which people invent and that highlight our various 
human failings. We laugh at our own humanity. Potatoes, earthworms and 
dogs do not do that because they do not ϐind anything funny about their 
potato-ness, earthworm-ness or dog-ness. Humans can’t help themselves, 
sometimes they simply have to laugh at themselves – at other times they 
have to cry. And sometimes they have to do both at the same time.
Neither angels nor demons. Angels are perfectly holy, demons are perfectly 
corrupt. One does not ϐind such extremes amongst humans. In reality you’re 
more likely to encounter a loving and hard-working father of a family whose 
potential includes various debasing tendencies, for example, selϐishness or 
a desire for power; it does not have to be a lot of power, just a little is enough, 
maybe in the ofϐice, at work or in the Parliament. Or you meet a clever 
adolescent, excellent at sports or programming, who, however, diminishes 
his ability to love with pornography every day. Or you observe your nice, 
decent neighbour, the greatest expert in solid welding in the whole area, kind 
and sweet who wouldn’t hurt a ϐly, naturally shy and retiring – allowing his 
humanity to be crushed by his uncontrollable desire for alcohol, by conceit 
which prevents him from reconciling a broken relationship with his brother 
or by his relationship with a television which completely takes over all his 
free time and which has dulled his mind over the years. By continually giving 
in to our animal instincts, we gradually become mere animals.
5 “The corruption of the best is the worst of all.”
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What a strange pot a human is where a mixture of the good and evil, the 
noble and ignoble, and the positive and negative are found perpetually 
boiling together. If the good predominates, if it is ever to become one’s 
habitual character, it won’t happen automatically or without work (Guroian, 
1998). Humanity does not come ready-made, it is not a given; instead it must 
be recognized as work, a calling or vocation which is requested of people to 
mature them. That is to ϐill one’s nature with some value or worth, the noble 
and digniϐied, and by that to prevent the atrophy which every dimension of 
humanity necessarily suffers if those qualities are ignored. And precisely 
that essential incompleteness of human nature is what gives meaning to 
moral education. If we were perfect – perfectly good like angels or perfectly 
evil like demons – moral (or any other kind of) education would not be 
needed. But because we are people whose humanity oscillates throughout 
our lives between opposing poles and tendencies, moral education has its 
place. Among all the forces in one’s life it can become an important if not the 
key factor that helps people to fulϐil their true nature; that is to become the 
person they should be (cf. Johnson, 2005).
In brief, human beings are special beings. Therefore we need special care: 
moral education.
3 “You should/not.” The problem of moral law
The second reason why we need education is the existence of moral reality, or 
the moral law as such. It discloses itself to human beings in common everyday 
situations in a way that calls for educational and self-educational actions. 
Consider for example the situation of interpersonal strife or disputes. Every 
one of us has been either a participant of or a witness to some disputes. In 
such situations we either hear, or ourselves utter, sentences like: “How would 
you like it if I did that to you?” – “Don’t jump the gun!” – “You are not going to 
leave me?” – “You ought to be ashamed of yourself!” – “Don’t lie to me.” – “But 
you promised.” And so on.6
The interesting thing is that the one who expresses such things does not just 
want to say that the other person’s behaviour is annoying, but is actually re-
ferring to a certain standard of behaviour which s/he assumes the other also 
6 The following subchapter is a loose paraphrase of the completely timeless “Radio Discussions” 
that C. S. Lewis presented in 1943 for the BBC radio to encourage the British public during 
the trials of World War II. These, together with other speeches, were later compiled in a book 
Mere Christianity.
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subscribes to. This assumption is immediately conϐirmed, either positively 
or negatively. The offender is either ashamed and tries to rectify the matter, 
or – more often – tries to explain or justify his/her actions. For example, s/
he argues that there was an extenuating circumstance which required or 
authorized them to behave that way; or that something had happened which 
prevented them from keeping a promise, etc. In any case it is evident that 
both parties are subscribing to a particular kind of law or criteria of decency, 
honesty and morality as if they had agreed on it. Although such an agreement 
is completely “silent”, that is, latent and without sophisticated philosophical 
verbalization, it is quite real.7 Without it, no kind of moral discourse would be 
possible. People could ϐight with one another like animals but they could ne-
ver argue in the human sense of the word. To dispute or argue means to try to 
show another person that s/he’s in error, or is guilty in a way. However, that 
would make no sense if the arguing had no common agreement as to what 
is right and what is wrong. It is like playing football with no rules, and then 
claiming someone fouled. To take that further, if there are no rules, there is 
either no game at all or it is a very dangerous game.8 That is precisely why it 
is necessary to have this particular art called moral education which teaches 
not only the rules but also respect for the rules (cf. Sokol & Pinc, 2003). 
Furthermore, there is another reason for moral education which is related to 
the existence of moral truth/reality. Aside from this common understanding 
that we should behave in a certain way, there is also the fact that nobody 
actually does behave that way all the time. Even though we know there is 
a moral law, which we admit when we say “I should”, we fail to observe it.
To avoid misunderstanding, I am not saying that as humans we are incapable 
of doing any good at all in our actions, motives or intentions. On the contrary, 
using the words of C. S. Lewis (1993) I want to draw attention to the fact that 
probably “this year, or this month, or, more likely, this very day, we have failed 
to practise ourselves the kind of behaviour we expect from other people” 
(p. 13). In our defence we can usually enumerate a host of “extenuating 
circumstances” which we tend to “work out” an excuse with or silence that 
7 For a beautiful example of the intuitive experience of moral reality see Karel Čapek’s story 
Výkřik (Cry) in his collection called Boží muka (Calvary).
8 The football minded reader can easily imagine what would happen in a game if they suddenly 
stopped adhering to the offside rule or ignored the borders of the ϐield; or if a player added 
the help of a baseball bat. 
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relentless demand “you should(n’t) do that.” Such self-defence can have 
many forms: “I know I behaved badly to my wife but I was so tired.” “I had to 
cover up that questionable transaction or I would be ϐired, and how would 
I pay off the mortgage then?” “The thing I promised to my neighbour and 
never did; I would have never promised that if I had known how much work 
would be piled on me.”
It does not matter whether the excuses are legitimate or not. The point of 
these illustrations is to demonstrate our awareness or consciousness of the 
moral law which is a human characteristic that is with us, in us, always part 
of our conscious awareness. If it were not so, we wouldn’t need to defend 
ourselves when we act against someone or vice versa. Nor would we know 
what it is to have a “clear conscience” when we act in accordance with it.9
It is worth noting one more moral-psychological situation with major 
relational-social implications. The difϐiculty of the process of admitting 
moral guilt usually leads to an ethical disproportion: behind my moral failure 
there can always be someone or something else; my morally good behaviour, 
on the other hand, is always only my own doing. Moreover, the truer the 
accusation of guilt is, the more intense is the tendency to transfer blame. 
Therefore, one of the key components of good moral education is rooting out 
these undesirable human tendencies (Guroian, 1998). 
4  Everything is permissible: A note on the postmodern 
situation
The third reason we need moral education is the moral situation which the 
Western world ϐinds itself in. In the last several decades we have observed 
something we could call renaissance of ethics. Not, however, because of an 
abundance of morals; quite on the contrary for a lack of them. The ethical 
“deϐicit” that is currently felt in Western society is generating a demand 
9 The concept of “clean conscience” is problematic, as we can see, for people have a remark-
ably wide range of psychological means at their disposal by which they can keep their con-
science subjectively “clean” without reference to objective moral reality. But that in itself 
shows even more clearly the need for moral education which would teach a student to apply 
that understanding to moral experience by desirable means. Regarding the problem of con-
science, see for example Anzenbacher (1994).
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on schools to get involved in the education of character.10 And it does not 
only concern developing decent socio-psychological habits, communication, 
cooperation or positive self-image which make human interaction easier 
and more pleasant. It involves much more: in fact, the discussion is about 
nothing less than an ethically inhabitable globe. For the ϐirst time in history, 
our planet is being threatened by its own (morally corrupt) inhabitants, or 
in the words of E. Fromm, the “physical survival of the population” is at stake 
(citation in Vacek, 2008, p. 6). If things continue as they are, the planet will 
become uninhabitable. As Lipovetsky (1999, p. 11) has written, “the 21st 
century will either be ethical or it will not be at all.”
What is the cause of this situation? Is it simply that people today are more 
corrupt, more morally decayed than people in previous generations? I do not 
think so. Anthropologically speaking, the essence of human nature remains 
the same; what changes is the climate in which the moral potential of our 
humanity is realised or developed – whether upwards towards a greater hu-
manity or downwards towards inhumanity. If you convince yourself on a phi-
losophical level that there is no such thing as an objective moral law, it makes 
it very difϐicult to behave morally on a practical level. This is what happened 
to modernity. Our present era of philosophy that we have festooned with 
critical attributes such as post-modern, hyper-modern or super-modern re-
cognises the crisis of modernity and the speciϐic ways of formulating moral 
thoughts and behaviours of people (Bauman, 2004). 
Paradoxically, when the modern paradigm was born, it looked very promi-
sing for ethics. The popular slogan of the Enlightenment philosophers’ was: 
sapere aude (dare to know), which then became “Man, trust your own re-
ason!” It was a reaction against the medieval tradition of trust in external 
authority. The Enl ightenment understood itself as the age of the adolescence 
of humanity: as that great moment in history when humanity ϐinally gathered 
the courage to liberate itself from the clutches of ignorance. Thus the newly 
discovered human ratio became the instrument of emancipation by which 
humanity hoped “to uncover, describe and explain the entire natural order of 
things” (Wright, 2004), and it would come about completely autonomously. 
10 This is evident in the vast amount of literature that has been produced on this subject in 
recent years. Besides classics such as Piaget or Kohlberg, see for example: Lickona (2003), 
Schaps, Schaeffer and McDonnell (2001), Berkowitz and Bier (2005), Hoge (2002), Čapek 
(2008), Lorenzová (2010), Olivar (1992), Vacek (2008), Erikson (1968), Fuchs (2003), 
Kohák (1993), Lipovetsky (1999), and Perry (1970).
950 Jan Hábl
In addition to a belief in the nearly omnipotent power of reason, the scenario 
of the modern story was also based on a belief in the moral progress of hu-
manity. Stanley Grenz (1997, p. 14) expressed it well: 
The modern scientist considers it as axiomatic, that what knowledge discovers 
is always good. This assumption of the inherent goodness of knowledge made 
the enlightened view of the world optimistic. It led to the belief that progress is 
inevitable, that science, together with the power of education, will ϐinally rid us of 
both our vulnerability to nature and all social slavery. 
Encouraged by the developments in the ϐield of science, modern humanity 
began to believe in advancement in the ϐield of morality as well. After all, the 
one who knows “rightly” will also act “rightly,” (won’t s/he?). The question of 
the connection between scientia and conscientia was itself not new but the 
assumption that science and education will be automatically the humanizing 
factor in the process of reϐining humanity got its doctrinal form only in the 
modern story (compare Menck, 2001).  Modern humanity has believed that 
progress towards better future is certain and that is only a matter of time; 
thanks to the unstoppable expansion of knowledge we will be able to control 
the natural world, even to “command the wind and rain”11 and ultimately 
achieve the long sought-after heaven on earth.12 
In the story of the twentieth century, however, modern hope began to slowly 
disintegrate. It became apparent that even though knowledge does bring 
unprecedented technical capabilities to humanity, that alone cannot ensure 
humaneness and moral reϐinement. It is clearly true that the one who knows 
has power, as Francis Bacon already noted.13 Likewise, it is indisputable 
that it is necessary to be led to knowledge that is to be taught. Historical 
experience has revealed, however, that knowledge and education can be 
used for evil as well as for good. When we think about the atrocities of the 
twentieth century in which science actively participated, the assumption 
of the modern period, i.e. that science is automatically humanizing, seems 
ridiculous and even criminally naive. Today, instead of gratefully indulging 
in the care of scientists, we tend to watch them with increasing suspicion 
11 This was a popular slogan of the protagonists of the communist regime who believed it is just 
a matter of time when science enables us to control the nature.
12 I discuss elsewhere the speciϐic pedagogical implications arising from the continuing 
optimism of the modern paradigm. See Hábl (2011c).
13 The idea that scientia potentia est was repeated by Bacon more than once in his period of 
revolutionary reϐlections. See for example Bacon (1974, p. 89, 186).
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and apprehension. Who knows what kind of abuse their techno-scientiϐic 
creations could be used for again (cf. Bauman, 2004)? The extraordinary 
development of technology and science which offers western society 
unprecedented power and wealth has also produced a host of problems which 
have grown to global proportions and can no longer be managed. The culture 
of abundance and prosperity contrasts sharply with the reality of poverty 
for millions of starving, destitute, illiterate and marginalized individuals and 
even whole nations whom the “civilized” world cannot help because it has 
enough problems of its own. Its advanced technocracy has generated a series 
of anti-human phenomena like the objectiϐication of mankind, the alienation 
of individuals and the depersonalization of interpersonal relationships. 
Instead of the longed-for heaven on earth, sociologists point out the reality of 
the dramatic decline of moral literacy, declining social capital (no-one trusts 
anyone anymore), threats of global self-destruction, clashes of civilizations, 
various forms of extremism, etc. Human being is even considered to be an 
“endangered species” (Sokol, 2002). 
Another problem of the modern meta-narrative that contributed to its own 
decline was its tendency towards totalitarianism, that is, to act with an 
exclusive interpretation of reality and the use of power as a tool. M. Foucault 
(2000) described it well when he noted how the modern scientiϐic discourse 
has been used as a means of all-pervasive dominance and surveillance. The 
form of monarchist totalitarianism may change but the essence remains 
the same. Many a totalitarian atrocity was legitimized under the auspices 
of the grand narratives – whether by the colonialists in the West14 or the 
Communists in the East.15 
14 In this context A. Finkielkraut (1993, p. 42) captured the link between the concepts of coloni-
zation and civilization nicely when he said that to civilize for the modern Westerner means, 
“to make one’s current conditions the example, to make a universal gift of one’s own habits, 
to make one’s own values the absolute criteria for assessment, and to consider the Europe-
an lord and master of nature as the most interesting being in creation. […] Because Europe 
typiϐied progress to other human societies, colonization seemed to be the fastest and noblest 
means for bringing the stragglers onto the track of civilization. The calling of industrialized 
nations seemed to be: to accelerate the path of non-Europeans towards education and wel-
fare. It was necessary, precisely for the good of primitive nations, to swallow up their diffe-
rences – that is, their backwardness – in Western universality.”
15 The speciϐic consequences of the totalitarian discourse are intimately known by everyone 
who lived under the communist regime which also possessed a great story about class 
struggle and which, as many still remember, should have led to the eschatological promise of 
heaven on earth.
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The result is that all the simple patterns and reference points on which the 
modern world was solidly constructed and which facilitated the choosing 
of life strategies have been shattered. The next generation weaned on 
postmodern milk no longer perceives reality as a cohesive and coherent 
whole in which it is possible to ϐind systematic meaning and logic, but 
rather as a confusion of random and changing events. The truth is an empty 
concept that means whatever anyone wants it to mean. Objective knowledge 
is irrelevant. Law and justice have been left at the mercy of the demon of 
interpretation.  And where future prospects are concerned, the post-modern 
generation does not believe that any scientiϐic, business or economic, let 
alone political, solution exists which would ensure better existence than what 
their parents had. For a post-modern individual, the progress of mankind has 
been utterly lost in romantic illusions. Moral principles have been completely 
relativized. Everything is permissible.16
5 Conclusion
We ϐind that we do not enjoy living in such a world. With every further 
billion stolen from the state budget, with each further promise broken or 
deceitful advertisement, the moral malaise of the people who have to adapt 
to it grows.17 As a result comes the call for ethics and moral education in 
our schools. It is almost certain that no book, lecture or article on the theme 
of ethics will make people more moral. At the same time, it is evident that 
one (optional) hour of moral education a week will not reform the emerging 
generation.18 We still have to discuss thoroughly “how to do [this educating] 
so that people not only know what is good but they want what is good and 
want to do good,” and to do so “even if no one is watching,” as one of the ϐirst 
architects of the mundus moralis19 said (Comenius, 1992, p. 570). One thing, 
however, is sure: we need moral education. And we need it for the three 
16 Compare with Dostoyevsky’s famous dramatic statement which he put in the mouth of 
one of Karamazov’s brothers: “If there is no god, everything is permissible.” Compare also 
Hol mes (1984).
17 Compare Bělohradsky’s “bondage” (2007).
18 In 2010 one optional lesson (45 min.) a week has been introduced to Czech schools by the 
Czech Ministry of Education as a response to the „increasing decline of morality“ in the 
Czech society. For more details see the given ministerial measure at http://www.msmt.cz/
ministerstvo/msmt-vydalo-doplnujici-vzdelavaci-obor-eticka-vychova?lang=
19 Mundus moralis, or The moral world, is the sixth level in the hierarchy of Jan Amos Comenius’ 
Pansophy which is one of the central chapters in his General consultation on the reform of 
human affairs. 
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reasons outlined in this paper. Firstly, because our humanity is inherently 
endowed with moral capacity. Secondly, because there is an ethical reality 
which appeals to human beings. And thirdly, because our experience has 
shown that without moral boundaries we risk self-destruction.
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„To bys neměl“
Tři poznámky k otázce potřeby etické výchovy
Abstrakt: Cílem této studie je předložit tři fundamentální důvody objasňující důležitost 
a potřebu etického vychovatelství – nejen ve školách, ale v principu. Studijní otázka 
zní: Proč člověk potřebuje jakékoli etické vychovávání? Jednotlivé části této studie 
budou pojednávat jednotlivé odpovědi, resp. důvody k etické edukaci. Ty pokrývají 
následující tři oblasti: 1) povaha člověka jako morální bytosti, 2) povaha samotné 
morální reality, 3) speciϐická povaha doby, ve které potřebu morálního vychovatelství 
rozpoznáváme. Z analýzy zmíněných jevů vyplývá argument ve prospěch tradičního 
etického realizmu, který etickou výchovu nejen předpokládá, ale též umožňuje. 
Z uvedeného vyplývá závěr, že etické vychovatelství je nejen potřebné a nutné, ale též 
ϐilosoϐicky legitimní. 
Klíčová slova: moralita, edukace, lidská povaha, modernita, postmodernita
